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Paul D'Arcy 
A significant body of post-war scholarship in Pacific History has focussed 
on the impact of Euro-American contact upon the indigenous inhabitants of the 
Pacific Islands. Interpretations have varied. Broadly speaking, these 
interpretations have tended to polarize around two distinct schools of 
thought. On one hand the so-called "fatal impact" school asserts that Pacific 
Islanders were unable to adjust to Euro-American inroads and collapsed under 
the strain. Two classic examples of this line of argument are Harrison 
Wright's 1959 study New Zealand, 1769-1840: Early Years of Western Contact, 
and Alan Moorehead's 1969 publication The Fatal Impact: An Account of the 
Invasion of the South Pacific 1767-1840. Both of the above authors claim that 
Western contact had devastating implications for indigenous Pacific 
societies. In particular, epidemics resulting from the introduction of exotic 
diseases, and a new, uncontrolled form of fighting caused by the introduction 
of firearms into traditional systems of warfare are said to have dramatically 
increased the mortality rate. Traditional systems of beliefs and practices 
could not control or explain these new circumstances. Decimated by epidemics, 
torn apart by unrestrained warfare, and with the basis of their system of 
beliefs undermined, these societies became demoralized and consequently less 
resistant to Western penetration and domination. 1 
Since the publication of these theories a number of scholars have sought 
to show that indigenous societies in the PaCific displayed a considerable 
degree of resilience and adaptability to Western contact. In this school of 
thought culture contact is seen not as the domination of PaCific Islander by 
European, but as a more positive interaction between two vibrant cultures. 2 
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In her 1971 article in the Journal of Pacific History "Guns and Men in 
Melanesia" Dorothy Shineberg examined the impact of firearms in the Pacific. 
Shineberg demonstrated that despite technological developments firearms were 
limited in range, accuracy, reliability and rate of fire up until the late 
1860s. Only with the development of the Martini-Henry rifle of 1871 were all 
of these problems effectively overcome. 3 
Focusing on the 1567 Mendana expedition in the Solomon Islands Shineberg 
shows how Melanesians soon overcame any initial awe they might have had for 
firearms and began to exploit the limitation of these weapons. Open combat 
was quickly abandoned for reliance on fighting in the bush where natural cover 
could be exploited for concealment, and fo~ protection from projectiles. 
Within six weeks of first experiencing gunfire some warriors from Guadacanal 
had realized that they could exploit the tell-tale flash of the ignition 
system's priming pan, which occurred just before the release of the projectile 
from the gun barrel 4, by diving under water to avoid being shot. Ramparts of 
sand were constructed to act as cover from arquebus fire, although no 
effective strategy was devised to counter the Spanish culverin which was able 
to breach this rampart. 5 
The longer the Solomon Islanders were exposed to gunfire, the greater 
their adaptations to it and the less effective its power. Shineberg felt that 
with time they would very probably have even gone underground to counter 
artillery as the Maori did two centuries later.6 But the Spanish stay was 
"too short for the ultimate in adaptations; which was for the Islanders 
themselves to acquire firearms.,,7 It was not until the Nineteenth Century 
that contacts with European and American vessels were sufficiently regular or 
sustained enough for such a process to occur. Firearms were among the 
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earliest and most eagerly sought items of Western material culture by 
Islanders throughout the Pacific. At the same time effective adaptations to 
the firearms of the time were devised rapidly, just as had occurred earlier in 
the Solomons. For example, as has already been noted, the Maori developed 
superb fieldworks to counteract European artillery while in New Caledonia 
warriors learned to draw volleys, dodge, and then set upon their musket-armed 
foe with clubs and spears before they could reload. 8 
This adaptability, combined with the technical defects of firearms prior 
to 1870 brings into question the degree to which the introduction of firearms 
did lead to increased fatalities in indigenous warfare. In a later article 
Shineberg noted that while the use of muskets did not appear to cause 
increased casualties on Espiritu Santo, the introduction to Tanna resulted in 
more deaths in hostilities than occurred in the pre-firearms' era. On Po nape 
muskets are said to have acted as a deterrent to hostilities. 9 This variety 
in response led Shineberg to suggest that more precise case studies of 
individual societies were required before a general conclusion upon the impact 
of firearms could be made. 10 
In 1974 in an article entitled "Firearms and Indigenous Warfare: A Case 
Study" Kerry Howe stated a similar opinion of future research directions into 
European weaponry in the PaCific islands. 11 Howe's article concentrated on 
the Loyalty Islands. He concluded that, in the Loyalty group at least, 
" ••• Europeans and their technology did not change the tactics and techniques 
of warfare as long as it lasted, and, in particular, firearms were responsible 
for killing only a small portion of those who died in the fighting. tl12 A 
number of reasons are given to account for this. The poor quality and 
technical shortcomings of the guns used made them unsuitable for the guerrilla 
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warfare practiced in the Loyalty's.13 The function of warfare did not change 
so that there was no reason to increase the number of casua.lties inflicted. 14 
Few studies have been devoted specifically to substantiate or repudiate 
Shineberg and Howe's conclusions on firearms in the. Pacific Islands. Firearms 
are usually only referred to in generalized terms as part of more wide ranging 
studi'es of island groups or themes. Clearly, more detailed studies are 
required. A study of firearms on Malaita in the latter part of the Ntneteenth 
Century is particularly useful for a number reasons. Malaita is a large, 
populous island in the southeast of the Solomon Islands. Much of the 
groundwork for this period on Ma laita has been covered' i'n Peter Carris' book 
on the Solomon Islands' labor trade, Passage, Port and Plantation. However, a 
more detailed focus on firearms tn indigenous warfare on Ma.laita in this 
pe}('iod serves to link Shineberg,'s study of the first conflict between 
EUi}('opeans and Solomon islanders with Peter Carris and Roger Keesing's. 
Ughbdng Meets the West Wind - The Malaita Massacre, which examines one of 
the last conflicts between, Europeans. and islanders in the form of the final 
'i "f" t" , paCl i lCd·lon of the Kwaio of Malaita in 1927.15 Shineberg's studies 
concentrate on a period notable for relatively impotent firearms, whereas by 
1870 fi rearms are becoming highly effecUve, deadly weapons. By 1927 the age 
of modern. firepower had well and truly arrived. 16 By examining. the· use of 
fi·}('earms in fighting between indigenous groups, this study is useful for 
contrasting with hostilities between Malaitans and Europeans. As speciHc 
iisland case study, this paper is not only useful for chronological comparisons 
within Malaitan history, but also for comparisons with studies of other 
geographical entities. 
Mendana's expedition had only l;.mited contact with Ma.laita when their 
brigantine constructed for coastal exploration briefly touched upon the 
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southern coasts of Malaita and South Malaita in April 1567. 17 The brigantine 
never spent more than one day at anyone place on these coasts. There was 
little chance or need for adaptation to the initial shock of encountering 
gunfire for the first time. Three separate encounters occurred on the first 
three days, all ending in hostilities. The only friendly interaction occurred 
on South Malaita after these hostile meetings. Each time the Spanish opened 
fire with their arquebusiers the islanders retired. The Spanish narratives 
are vague as to how panic-stricken these withdrawals were. 18 On two occasions 
the Spanish bullets struck one or more of the islanders, but in the other 
hostile action the islanders retired upon receiving a volley that caused no 
casualties. 19 This suggests that the Spanish firearms were initially 
intimidating not solely because of their ability to strike invisibly. 
With the departure of the brigantine Malaita returned to its former 
isolation from Western contact. On August 20, 1767 the English explorer 
Carteret 'discovered' Ndai island. 20 From Ndai he could see the nearby island \ 
of Manoaba to the southwest and beyond that the northeast coast of Malaita. 
After foiling what he perceived to be an attempted ambush by the inhabitants 
of Ndai, Carteret sailed away to the northwest on August 21 without 
investigating his sightings to the southwest. At Ndai Carteret felt that the 
inhabitants "seemed to have had some knowledge of firearms by their signs to 
us. "21 Carteret's observation may have been real or imagined. More recently 
Charles E. Fox has noted that in oral traditions there "seems to be no 
memories of Spaniards' visits unless the sea ghosts of San Cristobal, who fire 
at canoes, or the big sailing canoes of Santa Cruz with a deck and a house on 
them, called Tepuke, are memories of Mendana's big ships."22 Of course, these 
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phenomena may also have been inspired by ship visits after Mendana's 
expedition. 
When the French explorer Survi11e came to the southeast Solomons in 1769 
he found the people of U1awa, not unnaturally, initially suspicious and 
apprehensive about coming aboard. 23 U1awa had been visited by the same 
brigantine that had touched upon Ma1aita in 1567 and had had a similar 
encounter with Spanish firearms. 24 When one of the islanders aimed his bow 
menacingly at the French they opened fire with muskets. One of the islanders 
was hit, whereupon the U1awans fled back to shore. But this episode did not 
deter twenty canoes of warriors paddling out a few hours later and challenging 
the ship. They were soon put to flight by four rounds of grapeshot from the 
ship's cannon. 25 Survi11e's only encounter with Ma1aitans was when a few 
canoes came well offshore and traded with his vessel as it cruised south along 
Malaita's eastern shore. 26 
European visits to the southeast Solomons continued to be fleeting and 
sporadic after Surville's visit well into the Nineteenth Century. In the 
1830's traders and whalers began to frequent the Solomons in increasing 
numbers. But, as in the past, Malaita's contact with the European world 
remained very limited. 27 All this changed in the 1870's when European ships 
began visiting the Solomon Islands in pursuit of cheap labor for the newly 
emergent plantations of Queensland and Fiji. By the mid 1880's most islands 
in the Solomon group had been visited by labor recruiters, with Malaita being 
the most fruitful source of recruits.28 Through gifts from recruiters to 
facilitate recruitment and compensate for the absence of recruits from their 
communities, and through the purchasing power of their indentured wages 
Malaitans were introduced to a wide variety of western goods. 29 
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At the same time as the labor trade was beginning in the South West 
Pacific a series of independent inventions in Europe and North America were 
radically advancing the technical capabilities of firearms. 30 From the 1730's 
until the 1830's the standard service arm of the armies of Europe and the 
Americas were smoothbore flintlock muskets. Percussion muskets took over this 
role in the 1830's. By the 1850's percussion muskets were still in service 
but increasingly muzzle-loading rifles were coming into general service. 
Although firearm's technology had evolved since Mendana's day many of the same 
basic problems still existed. Smoothbore muskets had generally similar 
characteristics regardless of whether they had a flintlock or percussion 
ignition mechanism. A trigger mechanism was used to ignite a small powder 
charge on an external pan which in turn ignited a larger powder charge in the 
base of the musket barrel. The force of this latter ignition propelled a 
projectile out of the barrel. The ball had a smaller diameter than the smooth 
barrel to allow for loading of the projectile down the muzzle. Because of 
this it bounced from side to side in the barrel when fired and thus tended to 
curve in flight in the direction of the side of the barrel it had last 
struck. Furthermore, these projectiles were of relatively slow velocity and 
tended to drop away very qUickly in flight, and to be blown off course in 
strong winds. The external priming mechanisms were very vulnerable to 
dampness. As a result of all of these factors smoothbore muskets were 
generally unreliable at any range over one hundred yards, and were preferable 
used at ranges of fifty yards or less. The complicated loading procedure and 
the tendency for the inside of the barrel to become clogged with used powder 
charges meant that even in skilled hands the rate of fire was relatively slow 
and after prolonged use the muskets were prone to misfiring. 31 
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But by the end of the 1860's bullets were being inserted directly into a 
breech at the base of the barrel rather than having to be pushed down the 
barrel. This radically increased the rate of fire.. In 1867 Colonel Boxer, 
superi ntendant at the Royal Laboratory at .Woo lwi ch Arsena 1.. invented the an 
metal cartridge. This contained a percussion cap in its base as well as the 
projectile" thus doing away with the need for open powder charges and all 
their inherent problems. The metal cartridge also allowed the breech to be 
sea led at the moment of firing: to prevent the. usual leaking of' hot gases at 
the breach.. An of these developments meant that projectiles could now be 
Ughter fitting in gun barrels, and that these barrels could be grooved,. 0.1" 
rUled, to impar:-t spin on the projectile. This process improved both the 
speed and accuracy of the projectile.. By 1870 riJles such as. the s.i.ngJe shot 
Sn'ider were becoming fonnida:ble weapons" already highly accurate at ranges of 
many hundreds of yards. 32 The Martini-Henr:-y rifl,e adopted by the British anny 
i,n 1811 exemplified the new dominance of the rifle on the battlefield. "Fast,. 
accurate. tough, impervi,ous to the weather," it was 'I' ••• a weapon that made 
every other gun obsolete. "33 Yet it in turn was, soon outdated by the 
development of Quick-firing repeating rifles. 34 
These rapid advances in firearms technology meant that every few years, 
waves of discarded obsolete weapons flooded the internati.onal anns' 
markets.35 In this W8.¥ many smoothbore muskets had found their way to those 
PacHic islands in contact with Europeans and Americans. 36 Now it was the 
turn of Malaita and others. In the 1860's attempts were made to keep up with 
the advancing technology of the day by converting r:-ecently issued 
muzzleloading rifles to breechloading rifles by adding breech block 
mechanisms. The British anny, for example, converted its muzzleloadiflg 
Enfields by adding the breech block mechanism invented by Jacob Snider of New 
York. This greatly increased the capabilities of these Enfields but in 1869 
the Snider-Enfield, as the converted model was known, was abandoned for the 
new Martini-Henry rifle. 37 Through the medium of British Imperial connections 
and the advance of military technology, entrepreneurs in Australia and Fiji 
were thus given access to large numbers of Snider-Enfields at a time when they 
sought to expand their labor recruiting activities in the Solomon Islands. 
The Snider-Enfield might be outdated in Europe, but in the Pacific Islands it 
represented a major improvement on the smoothbore muskets that were the 
predominant trade firearm in the Pacific up until this time. 
As in most of the Pacific islandso firearms became much sought after among 
Solomon islanders as the labor trade developed. 38 When the Queensland 
Government attempted to impose limitations upon the quantity of guns and 
ammunition that recruits could take with them back to Melanesia, the Premier 
of Queensland, John Douglas, was confronted by a delegation of two hundred 
Melanesians who told him that if such a restriction were imposed "no more boys 
come along Queensland. Boys altogether go Fiji. Plenty guns along of 
Fiji."39 Nevertheless a complete ban on firearms and ammunition sales to 
Pacific islanders was imposed in 1884 in areas under British control. 40 The 
result was that recruiters for Fiji and Queensland lost out greatly to French 
and German rivals who were still free to entice recruits by offers of 
firearms. 41 A Snider rifle was a significant investment, costing the 
equivalent of about one year's wages in the 1890's.42 Many Malaitans went to 
New Caledonia or Samoa instead where large number of Winchester, Snider and 
Spencer rifles were available. 43 Many laborers in Queensland simply returned 
to Melanesia with their wages intact and then bought guns into Malaita after 
59 
the 1884 ban. despite the risk of confiscation of guns without compensation if 
they were discovered by Colonial authorities. 45 
Prior to the banning of firearms and ammunition sales in 1884 many muskets 
and rifles were introduced into Malaita. By 1883 Commander Moore of the Royal 
Navy's Australian Squadron estimated that no fewer than 100 rifles and 1500 
muskets annually, with appropriate supplies of ammunition, went into the New 
Hebrides from Queensland alone either as recruitment "gifts" or as purchases 
by time-expired laborers. Moore felt that the Solomon Islands, and 
particularly Malaita were no less well equipped. 46 That same year Bishop 
Selwyn, a leading church figure in the South West Pacific, reported that every 
recruit brought back one or more guns and three to four hundred rounds of ball 
cartridge. One chief on Ysabel had "upwards of one hundred stands of arms, 
many of them breechloaders, and a few Winchesters."47 
After 1884 firearms continued to come into Malaita, albeit on a 
significantly smaller scale, through smuggling or through the medium of French 
and German recruiters. In 1890, for example, the German recruiting vessel 
Maria secured seventy-two recruits from Port Adams alone, each of whom 
received one Snider rifle and a quantity of ammunition. The next year a 
French recruiting vessel had no trouble attracting recruits with its offer of 
two Sniders and ammunition per recruit. 48 In 1897 the British Resident 
Commissioner in the Solomon Islands, Charles Woodford, was informed that over 
fifty rifles were smuggled into Malaita onboard one ship in the previous 
year. 49 As late as 1908 cases of gun smuggling were still being reported. 50 
In fact the illegal trade in Sniders and Winchesters continued into the 1920's 
on Malaita. 51 In 1927 one district in north Malaita surrendered 1070 rifles 
to Colonial authorities during their attempt to disarm the island. 52 
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The main weapons involved in the labor trade were tomahawks, old 
smoothbore muskets, Snider-Enfield rifles, with some modern repeating rifles 
on occasion. 53 In 1884 the recruiter William Wawn mentioned that "smoothbore 
muskets and very often even Snider rifles" were the most common forms of 
recruiting inducement offered. 54 Commander Moore's estimate of a fifteen to 
one ration for muskets to rifles in the labor trade is probably correct up to 
the mid-1880's.55 Writing in 1887, Bishop Selwyn felt that most of the guns 
involved were breechloaders. 56 From the mid-1880's Snider rifles were the 
predominant trade guns coming into the Solomon Islands. 57 
A number of contemporary European authorities felt that this influx of 
firearms was causing severe disruption to Malaita. By 1887, J.B. Thurston, 
the Assistant High Commissioner to the Western Pacific, felt that these 
weapons were "demoralizing the Natives of the PaCific and bringing about their 
rapid destruction."SB In 1888 some members of the Colonial Office were of the 
opinion that if arms and liquor sales were not prohibited the islanders would 
be wiped out. 59 Some believed that European arms had exacerbated intergroup 
fighting and murder because they made killing easier. 60 Inherent in these 
perceptions were the beliefs that firearms were superior to the traditional 
armory, and that indigenous societies were incapable of or unwilling to 
regulate their use of firearms. 
Prior to the introduction of firearms the main weapons in the Malaitan 
armory were spears, lances, clubs, and bows and arrows. 61 Most projectile 
weapons had sharp flint tips capable of inflicting a disabling wound. Large, 
thin wicker shields were often carried by Solomon Islanders. 62 In skillful 
hands these shields were sufficient to ward off projectiles. For fighting at 
close quarters Malaitan warriors relied on lances and a variety of clubs. The 
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Spanish found the warriors of Ma1aita's southern coast anned with clubs 
consisting of a stone head the size of an orange attached to a wooden shaft. 
Other clubs consisted of four to six foot long pieces of very hard timber, 
shaped so that one end was somewhat flattenedy tapering down to two sharp 
edges. In a fight on Santa Isabel in 1769 one of Survi11e's men received a 
blow to the head with such a club which cut open his hat and split his head 
down to the bonec During the same fight other Frenchmen were wounded by deep 
thrusts from lances, some penetrating as ,much as five inches into the body. 
Only one man died from his wounds however. 63 While ,skilled warriors oould 
dodge or parry clubs, lances and traditional projectiles, the Snider-Enfield 
and other fi,reanns of its time struck invisibly and carried inmense hitting 
powe,r, even at some distance. Wicker shields and nimble footwork were of 
little use against such weapons in the right hands. 
From an early date, Melanesians had a reputation as "savage" and warlike 
people. Within Melanesia, some islands were particularly notori'ous. Malaita 
was one of these is1ands. Malaita ,men had a reputation among EurQpeans for 
being truculent, self assertive and treacherous, and were rega,rded with 
c,aution by most outside,rs, including other Solomon islanders. The island 
appeared to many observe,rs to be in a continual state of tunnoil. 64 The 
population of Mala ita was highly fragmented lingui.stica ny, geographica llyand 
politically. Settlements on Malaita ranged in size from ten to two hundred 
people, with political units correspondingly small and localized. A 
distinction was made between the inland people and the coastal dwellers" 
Whereas the people of the interior tended to live in small, scattered hamlets 
practicing swidden agriculture and rearing pigs, the coastal peoples tended to 
live just offshore on small, densely populated, islands in the shelter of the 
vari ous 1 agoons li ni ng Mala ita's coastline. Some of these is 1 anrls were 
man-made. 65 
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A more or less continual state of tension existed between inland and 
coastal peoples. This did not prevent the existence of regular market days 
between the two groups. Such markets were held on the coast opposite the Lau 
and Langalanga lagoons every few days.66 Kinship ties also linked the two 
peoples. Kwaisulia, a prominent figure in the Lau lagoon, was born out of a 
union between a coastal mother and an inland father. Such links gave the 
coastal peoples access to garden land and fresh water on the mainland. 67 
Larger trade networks also existed. For example, the inhabitants of North 
Malaita used ebony from Isabel for their spears and bows. 68 Links outside of 
localized units tended to be very tenuous, even between neighboring groups.69 
Warfare was not a way of life on Malaita; rather it was a part of a way of 
life. Fighting was to a large degree formalized, with a number of social 
restraints acting upon it. Warfare was intimately associated with certain 
beliefs and customs central to the cohesion of society. All insults and 
injuries, perceived or real, or infractions of social tabus such as adultery 
required the seeking of compensation for the affront to coomunity mana or 
prestige. 70 Revenge could be exacted upon the perceived guilty party, or his 
kin, as a policy of collective responsibility was pursued. 72 Killings might 
be conducted by individuals without community sanction for personal reasons. 
The perpetrator's community would support and protect him, unless he was 
believed to be a sorcerer, in which case he would be handed over to the 
aggrieved party.73 This sense of collective responsibility and group prestige 
served to strengthen social cohesiveness. 74 On occasion revenge was sought 
through the offering of rewards for the death of certain individuals. Such 
rewards were known as blood money.75 This system of order led to an endless 
round of revenge killings and caused continual tension between groups. 
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Hostilities were characterized by weeks of anxious waiting with many 
threats and little action. Fighting might be heralded by a formal declaration 
or simply begin with a surprise attack or the ambush of an unsuspecting 
victim. When a death occurred there would be a combination of confusion and 
excitement, or threats of revenge combined with fear. The aggrieved party 
might rush out of the village to tear up gardens or do some other damage·, or 
seek a quick counterkilling of some harmless connection of the suspected 
instigator. Both sides might simply shut themselves up in their villages, 
enduring sleepless nights and neglecting their crops. Gradua,lly the tension 
would die down and normal life would resume until the next affront or until 
redistribution could be executed. Then the process would beg·in again. 76 
The actual number of killings was relatively small. Open fights were 
practically unknown.,. Where they did occur they followed the general pattern 
of hostilities, being characterized by demonstrations of force and threats of 
attack that rarely materialized. The first casualties would usually decide 
the issue, although fierce battles might rage over the possession ofa corpse, 
which carried great social signi'ficance in terms of ~. 77 The more usual 
forms of hostilities were ambushes of unsuspecting victims or surprise attacks 
on villages. 78 Some European observers such as Captain Simpson of H.M.S. 
Blanche found the Malaita method of warfare somewhat cowardly.79 But such a 
judgement fails to put warfare on Malaita in its social context. Malaitan 
warriors could be extremely brave as the castaway John Renton discovered. On 
one occasion one warrior remained firing arrows into a raiding party when the 
rest of his village had fled. Despite the obvious danger of encirclement he 
stood firm until he was surrounded and dispatched. SO 
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In a society of highly fragmented, mutually suspicious communities, 
tensions were never far from the surface. A number of factors operated to 
reduce the intensity of intergroup relations. Attempted mediation between 
hostile groups by third parties or elected mediators such as the aofia of the 
Lau lagoon show that warfare was not the sole means by which compensation was 
sought. 81 Peace ceremonies sought to· resolve conflict by appeasing both 
sides. This usually involved material compensation for injuries inflicted, or 
ritual exchanges.82 Social bonds and economic needs imposed controls of 
inter-group hostility. Killing had no rationale in itself. It was a means of 
maintaining individual and communal prestige by assuring that all deaths were 
avenged. At the same time the fear of retaliation tended to tone down the 
level of this revenge. Arthur Hopkins, a missionary on Malaita, noted that 
there was little hostility in their feuds and that they rarely fought with the 
lust to kill. 83 
Although notions of hereditary power existed, in general leaders on 
Malaita did not rule by any given right. Rather they exerted influence by 
virtue of their ability in various fields of socially valued endeavors such as 
martial prowess,manipulation of magic, oratory, and the ability to acquire 
and distribute wealth. Such non-institutionalized l~adership was highly fluid 
and dependent on constant reassertion of the skills for which these leaders 
were valued.84 In warfare leaders earned their status through their ability 
to direct the community's war efforts and for their own fighting abilities. 
Such men were known as~. They acted as the chief avengers in the system 
of blood feuding that prevailed on Malaita. Much of their power and wealth, 
and the loyalty of their followers depended on their collecting blood money 
and redistributing it. 85 
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In the decade or so before firearms became widespread certain coastal 
groups were able to use their relative advantage in access to guns to assert 
themselves over their enemies. In particular coastal groups gained a 
temporary ascendancy over their enemies. 86 Praninent leaders called passage 
masters were able to extend their influence beyond the usual localized limits 
of traditional society. Passages were safe ports of call for recruiting 
ships, usually at places where tracks from the interior met the coast thus 
giving access to recruits from inland communities as well as coastal 
settlements (assuming that the coast people were agreeable!). The"passage 
masters gained influence through thei.r manipulation of contacts· with 
.recruiting ships which they sought to monopolize. Such interactions gave them 
access to western goods, including firearms. 87 
Peter Corris' study of the passage master Kwaisulia of Ada Gege has shown 
that while firearms aided in defeating Ada Gene's rivals Manaoba and Fuana 
Fou,88 the manipulation of traditional roles was of major importance in his 
influence. Kwaisulia was a ~ who also possessed some hereditary standing 
in Ada Gege. It was not so much his access to western goods but his 
manipulation of their distribution that earned him influence. There are 
indications that Kwaisulia overstepped traditional limitations in a number of 
instances. His conduct of warfare against his enemies was more vigorous than 
was usual and forced them to flee. He seems also to have appropriated rights 
accorded only to hereditary Lau chiefs. He soon eclipsed all local leaders in 
his mana and was de facto leader of his area from the 1880's until his death 
in 1909.89 
For all his achievements he did not leave any enduring power. Kwaisulia 
was, in essence, using a new means to pursue traditional aims based on a 
system that lacked any mechanisms for ensuring the continuity of power beyond 
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any individual's lifetime. Although information is lacking on other Malaita 
passage masters such as Billy Mahualla of Alite Bay and Foulanger of Port 
Adam, they seem also to have owed their influence to traditional practices as 
well as to association with recruiting ships.90 
The coastal peoples of Malaita no longer sought to monopolize the 
Queensland and Fiji labor trade after 1884. The demand for firearms seems to 
have been satisfied in certain coastal areas of Malaita by this time, meaning 
that there was less incentive to seek recruitment. 91 Some coastal communities 
were becoming increasingly discerning in their tastes by 1883. In that year 
the Daphne had trouble obtaining recruits on Malaita because it only offered 
poor quality rifles. 92 Other reasons for this move are evident, such as the 
social disruption of the long-term absence of many of the young males of these 
communities. 93 With the sale of firearms to islanders banned it may have no 
longer seemed dangerous to allow enemies access to the recruiting ships. 
As a result Malaita men from the interior became increasingly prominent on 
the recruitment lists after 1884. Although many still went to Australia and 
Fiji despite the ban on firearms, the desire to own a gun still figured 
strongly in their motivation for volunteering for indentured service. 94 
French and German recruiters managed to get Malaitan labor despite the poor 
conditions on the plantations they recruited for because of their inducements 
of rifles and ammunition for volunteers. 95 By the 1890's the distribution of 
firearms was becoming more equitable. Coastal dwellers and inland peoples 
previously lacking in guns were soon arming themselves with Snider-Enfields, 
often giving them an advantage over their former tormentors who generally had 
less modern guns. The coastal settlements were upset at the arming of the 
interior communities. 96 But the continued influence of Kwaisulia despite the 
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rise in firepower of his enemies like Manoaba suggests that fireanns were not 
as influential as has been generally asserted. 97 
In adopting fireanns Malaitans became dependent on an external force of 
weaponry over which they had limited control. The 1884 fireanns' ban severely 
curtailed, but by no means halted, the flow of fireanns into Malaita. Without 
a plentiful, accessible source of fireanns Malaitans were forced to learn how 
to repair and maintain their original trade guns or rely on gradually 
deteriorating weapons. Most of the muskets and rifles that came into the 
hands of Pacific islanders had been bought cheaply by Euro-American 
entrepreneurs from discarded army stocks as trade items. 98 Walter Ivens, a 
missionary on Malaita, felt. that the Snider carbines used there were " ••• not 
very serviceable weapons."99 A number of European observers on Malaita in the 
1920's felt that by this time the islanders' guns were more of a danger to 
their possessor than to the targets they were aimed at. 1OO However, the 
condition of Malaitan fireanns was more complex than these observers suggest. 
The Kwaio of the interior of Malaita kept their guns well oiled, polished and 
dry above the men's house fires at night. 101 In the late 1920's the fonner 
inspector of labor R.F. Thomson noted that the locals (i.e. Malaitans) seemed 
to have a " ••• natural faCility for bringing old blunder busses up to date with 
hair triggers and other attachments they fashion."102 At the same time Ivens 
claimed that relatively good quality tower rifles were damaged by the Lau 
lagoon mens' habit of filing off part of the barrel to allow for easier 
storage in their canoes. 103 
The end of free access to Euro-American weapons' technoTogy in 1884 and 
the end of the labor trade in the early 1900's must have severely curtailed 
Malaita's access to anmunition. Walter Ivens thought that there were no 
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cartridges available on Malaita" by the 1920's. It is more probable that there 
was an irregular trickle of cartridges in these later years. 104 This scarcity 
caused grossly inflated prices. For example, Snider cartridges smuggled onto 
Malaita from nearby Gela could sell for as much as 3 per cartridge in the 
early 1900s. 105 Accordingly anmunition tended to be used judiciously and 
Malaitans became adept at converting cartridges from more modern rifles for 
use in their old firearms. 106 
It is debatable whether the level of violence in this period was greater 
than in pre-firearms' times. While Peter Corris suggests that firearms caused 
a rise in casualties and stimulated hostilities on Malaita, Deryck Scarr has 
questioned this viewpoint. 107 There certainly are indications of an unsettled 
state of affairs on Malaita after 1870. Walter Ivens felt that whereas 
killings had social meaning in earlier times men now killed either for the 
sake of killing or in order to get some desired object owned by their 
victim. 1OB In a six week period in 1900 Arthur Hopkins reported twelve 
killings in his area alone. 109 The succession of the aofia in the Lau lagoon 
is said to have ended in this period, removing a check on an already 
escalating level of bloodshed. 110 This dislocation of the aofia title may 
have been a sign of Kwaisulia's rising influence over the lagoon area or the 
result of a rising level of conflict discrediting the role of the aofia. 
The power of the ramo apparently increased during the period of the labor 
trade. Missionary accounts refer to disruptive bands of "bravoes" and 
independent professional killers who terrorized the population and eagerly 
sought to collect any blood money that was in the offering. 111 These 
descriptions may be more than just miSSionary bias. Malaita was disturbed by 
the return of time-expired indentured laborers who tended to arrive 
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well-anned, self-confident, and alienated to various degrees .from their old 
customs and conventions. 112 . It may also be a result of a preference to pay 
for "professionals" rather than seek redress on one's awn accord because of 
the dangers that fireanns now introduced into warfare. Certainly fireanns are 
claimed to have made the job easier for ramo, some of whom built up large kill 
tallies. For instance, Irokwato of Malaita is said to have killed at least 
forty men and maybe as many as one hundred in hi s career as a~. He 
usually shot his victims from a concealed position. 113 .This trend towards the 
use of specialists contradicts the general pattern in Polynesia where the 
introduction of fireanns tended to act as an ,equalize,r, maHng all combatants 
potentially lethal. 1l4 
The use of fireannsmay have led to an increasing reliance on 
fortifications. Manmade defenses were used on Malaita prior to the 
introduction of fireanns, and any ,adjustments that occurred to compensate for 
gun fire, were usually variations of traditional defenses rather than new 
types of fortifications. Sieges occurred both before and after the 
introduction of fireanns,although evidence on the relative frequency of 
sieges is lacking. 115 There is mention of a heavy, close-set palisade built 
to shelter the inhabitants of AdaGege from rifle fire from the mainland which 
was only a few hundred yards away.. At night the landing places were closed 
with logs and sentries kept watch.116 Such defenses were not new. Prior to 
the introduction of firearms Renton mentions that the coastal village of "sulu 
Fou" was .surroundedbya decaying breastwork of logs sometime around 1870. 
Thi.s breastwork had served as a defence in an earl ier siege. 117 The 
tr.ansition from .breastworks tofu11 palisades cannot be definitely attributed 
. to fireanns, as double lines of log palisades, loopholed for archers, were 
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used to defend hill settlements in traditional times. Ivens states that the 
use of palisades in the Lau lagoon area hailed fran the hills. 118 Hopkins 
describes one such hill settlement palisade as being from eight to ten feet 
high and constructed of heavy tree trunks. He added that the space between 
the two palisades of one village had been filled in with soil, possibly as an 
added protection against bullets. 119 
Rannie's account of Ada Gege in 1886 and Wawn's description of artificial 
islands at Auki in 1888 both refer to thick stone walls on the outside of 
these islands. 120 Ivens refers to the construction of a stone wall around the 
island of Funaa You as protection fran rifle bullets in anticipation for an 
expected attack by Sulu You sometime between 1888 and 1890. 121 These stone 
walls were not necessarily adaptations to gunfire. Renton mentions stone 
breastworks on the artificial islands of the Lau lagoon prior to the 
introduction of firearms. 122 Accounts by Ivens and Renton of the construction 
of artificial islands suggest these stone walls may have served a primarily 
structural role that later proved useful as fortifications. 123 In contract to 
the adaptation of existing features, Kwaisulia also used barbed wire in the 
defences of Ada Gege~ 124 
Ivens' and the castaway John Renton's accounts of warfare show a great 
deal of continuity in the conflicts that occurred in north eastern coastal 
Malaita before and after the introduction of firearms. 125 Massacres occurred 
in Renton's day as well as in the post-firearms era of Ivens', but in general 
both depict an intermittent series of low-level conflicts, occasionally 
punctuated by more bloody encounters. Possibly the scope of alliances 
expanded with the introduction of firearms, with warriors fran as far afield 
as Port Adam fighting in the conflicts of the Lau lagoon in the firearms 
era. 126 
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The use of firearms seems to have been modified to suit existing 
approaches to fighting. Projectile weapons had existed in the traditional 
arsenal, but much of the actual killing was done at close range with clubs, 
lances or projectiles. In the dense bush environment of Malaita the field of 
vision was restricted, and assailants could approach their victims 
undetected. Even in open fights the antagonists were in close proximity to 
each other. In the 1870's the rifle replaced the club as the favorite weapon 
of Malaitan warriors. 127 Most killings continued to be enacted at very short 
range with either rifle or club, thus neutralizing the·chief advantage of the 
rifle -- its ability to kill at a distance. 128 
Shortages of ammunition were probably a major reason for the use of close 
range firing after the end of the Labor trade in the Twentieth Century. 129 
But internal cultural factors also seem to > have influenced the use of 
firearms. It is perhaps significant that when the Kwaio ~ Basiana killed 
District Officer Bell in 1927 he did so by using his rifle to club Bell to 
death, rather than to shoot him. 130 Attacks on visiting recruiting vessels in 
the 1880's were conducted with metal tomahawks rather than firearms. 131 
In traditional times weapons had much symbolic value. Some weapons were 
handed down from generation to generation, linking their possessor to his 
ancestors. 132 In Malaitan religion ancestral spirits were believed to be able 
to influence wordly affairs. Weapons, including tomahawks and firearms 
procured in the era of labor tade were often consecrated to ancestors. 133 In 
many ways the rifle was as much a status symbol as a weapon. Amongst the 
Kwaio at least, rifles were Kwanga, or lightning, -- a term reflecting their 
awesome potential as tools of revenge. Weapons were extensions of the 
warriors' arm and manifestations of his potency and a sign of his manhood. 134 
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In some parts of the Solomon Islands large numbers of firearms were 
accumulated by certain men. 135 Such caches could bring an individual a great 
deal of prestige and influence through their judicious redistribution within 
his community. By the 1890's trade goods had received equivalent values in 
indigenous currencies. Some goods were even being used directly in exchange 
systems such as bride-price payments. Rifles were amongst the items included 
in the latter group. 136 
Firearms were not exploited to anything near their full military potential 
despite the fact that many warriors were good marksmen. 137 Ivens never saw 
the Malaita men use sights to aim at an enemy. Sniders were often fired from 
the hip without any attempt to take aim. When a person was shot deliberately 
it was generally only because the rifle was thrust close to his body and the 
trigger pulled. Even at close range misses were recorded. 138 
On the rare occasions that general confrontations occured rifle fire 
tended not to cause much damage. For example, in the sieges of Sulu Vou and 
Ada Gege by Funaa Vou and Manaoba in the late 1880's both sides fired many 
rounds of ammunition but no casualties resulted on either side. The only 
deaths occurred when a helpless straggler and child were discovered on the 
mainland opposite Ada Gege and promptly dispatched. 139 However, on another 
occasion a canoe-borne attack on Funaa Vou by Sulu Vou and its allies was 
driven off "with loss" by rifle fire from the shore. 140 
Much of the reasons for the ineffective use of firearms occurred as a 
result of the large degree of continuity in Malaitan attitudes to warfare. 
There was no need to kill more victims than was necessary for adequate 
satisfaction for insult or injury. To do so only invited future retaliation 
on a similar scale. No leader or community was able to forge any permanent 
political units beyond the localized level of traditional society. The power 
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of firearms was not enough to overcome the divisive elements of Malaitan 
culture. The chance of creating more centralized rule through force declined 
as firearms became widespread. 
Some thirty years after the introduction of firearms hostilities were 
still being conducted along traditional patterns and for traditional reasons. 
On the death of Kwaisulia in 1909 Ada Gege sought revenge on the "sorcerer" 
. who was perceived to have caused his death. The accused man was a chief of 
Sulu Vou, a neighboring island a few hundred yards away. This chief's 
conmunity refused to hand him over, however.. Every day at low tide the Ada 
Gege men would march out over the lagoon .towards Sulu Vou and. vociferously 
challenge the Sulu Vou people to surrender the accused man. Despite their 
exposesd position no volleys seem to have been exchanged. Rather, the 
antagonists contended themselves with raids on each others' gardens. Every 
. day envoys arri ved from the bush. to each island offeri ng all i ances - at a 
price I The accused man managed to flee from Sulu Vou until the stonli blew 
over. Although he returned to Sulu Vou and tensions declined the threat of 
eventual retribution still persisted. 141 
As the above example shows the British declaration of a protectorate over 
the Solomon Islands in 1893 did not lead to an imnediate end to fighting on 
Malaita. Coastal Malaita, with its growing Christian enclaves and rising 
awareness of the advantages of participating in the white man's world, became 
less of a problem with time for the British administration. In any case, 
troublesome coastal villages were, relatively accessible for punitive 
~asures. But the population of Ma1aita's interior caused the British 
authorities particular trouble. In response to perceived missionary attempts 
to challenge traditional ways and ideas, many inland ~retaliated with 
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intimidation of Christian converts and teachers. Often this took the form of 
slayings. 142 
The efforts of the Solomon Island's administration to protect Malaita's 
Christian population and to "pacify' the interior was continually hampered by 
a lack of finances. The District Officer on Malaita had only thirty to forty 
native troops at his disposal. His transportation was limited to one 
whaleboat. 143 It is not surprising therefore that blood feuds continued and 
mission stations were raided with impunity. Almost daily Malaitan Christians 
fell victim to some lurking warrior. Even the District Officers' headquarters 
at Auki was submitted to sniping. 144 
Under the direction of District Officer Bell much effort was put into 
"pacifying" the island in the years following his arrival at Auki in 1915. 145 
In response to this mounting pressure, and influenced by the realization that 
their days of autonomy were numbered, elements of the Kwaio killed Bell, his 
assistant, and a number of accompanying native police at Gwee'abe in October, 
1927. It was a symbolic last blow for their threatened way of life and much 
loved independence. 146 
The resultant backlash brought much death and suffering to the Kwaio. A 
punitive expedition of Solomon island planters, naval personnel from the 
Australian naval vessel Adelaide and Solomon islanders soon arrived at 
Malaita. The European portion of this force proved ineffective in the rugged, 
bushclad interior so that the job of hunting down the Kwaio fugitives was soon 
left to native police and Melanesian volunteers. 147 Many of these men were 
from north Malaita. Their prime motivation for hunting down the Kwaio was to 
avenge past grievances against them rather than any feeling of loyalty to the 
whiteman. l48 They were as skilled in tracking and in bush warfare as their 
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quarry, 149 but had a major advantage in that they had been issued with modern 
repeating rifles. In comparison the Kwaio possessed a limited number of 
single shot rifles and were probably short of ammunition. l50 They could not 
hope to win a stand up fight. Their only hope of evading their foe " ••• lay 
tn constant mobility; in cooking wild yams and drinking at night; and hiding 
in the wild bush by day ••• "151 • With European control of field operations 
negligible, shrines were desecrated, pigs killed, houses burnt, women and 
children murdered and prisoners shot by the revenge-seeki.ng north Malaitans. 152 
By the end of 1927 most or a] 1 of the Kwaio fugitives were dead or had . 
surrendered.. Many more died afterwards of dysentery while in captivity at the 
Protectorate's capital Tulagi. Those who remained on Mal aita' fared little 
better. Demoralized by the desecration of their shrines,- and denied 
subsistence by the-. destruction of their piigs and taro many Kwato d.ied in the 
year followtng the bloody retribution. which. so brutally ended their old. way of 
life. 153 
The' success of the Kwaio in resisting British attempts to control them had 
proven to be their undoing. Remaining outside of the new emerging order, 
resulting from European penetration~ they were placed at a major disadvantage 
to their coastal counterparts, who gained a decisive lead in coming to tenns 
with the whiteman's ways. The Kwaio could not win; their resistance merely 
delayed an inevitable process. The final blow came when their traditional 
rivals combined with a global power and its superior technology of destruction 
to attack a common foe. whose cultural conservatism had incurred their 
hostility. 
The Malaitan response tofireanns does much to support the conclusions of 
Shineberg and Howe. Despite the dramatic improvement of fireanns technology, 
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the use ,of guns in indigenous fighting on Ma1aita was successfully modified to 
suit traditional attitudes towards warfare in the late part of the Nineteenth 
Century. While the function of warfare remained the same, the form of warfare 
required modification to accommodate the use of firearms. Specific case 
studies, be they temporal and/or spatial, run the risk of presenting a false 
impression of the wider reality. Case studies must be viewed in a more 
generalized context to reveal their real significance. Ma1aitans were now 
more dependent on an external source of supply for their favored weaponry_ 
Their suppliers had differing attitudes and objectives. This was merely one 
aspect of a general era of change as European penetration progressed. Pacific 
islanders could still have much influence over their own destiny. But if the 
initial cultural resilience that many displayed was not followed by cultural 
adaptation and flexibility· in the long term, very real problems loomed in the 
future. 154 
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